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shareholders’ equity, and  ﬁ  xed or ﬂ  oating coupon bonds in the form of con-
tingent capital or subordinated debt. The return on the bank’s assets follows a 
jump-diffusion process, and default-free interest rates are stochastic. The equilib-
rium pricing of the bank’s deposits, contingent capital, and shareholders’ equity 
is studied for various parameter values characterizing the bank’s risk and the 
contractual terms of its contingent capital. Allowing for the possibility of jumps 
in the bank’s asset value, as might occur during a ﬁ  nancial crisis, has distinc-
tive implications for valuing contingent capital. Credit spreads on contingent 
capital are higher the lower is the value of shareholders’ equity at which conver-
sion occurs and the larger is the conversion discount from the bond’s par value. 
The effect of requiring a decline in a ﬁ  nancial stock price index for conversion 
(dual price trigger) is to make contingent capital more similar to non-convertible 
subordinated debt. The paper also examines the bank’s incentive to increase 
risk when it issues different forms of contingent capital as well as subordinated 
debt. In general, a bank that issues contingent capital has a moral hazard incen-
tive to raise its assets’ risk of jumps, particularly when the value of equity at the 
conversion threshold is low. However, moral hazard when issuing contingent 
capital tends to be less than when issuing subordinated debt. Because it reduces 
effective leverage and the pressure for government bailouts, contingent capital 
deserves serious consideration as part of a package of reforms that stabilize the 
ﬁ  nancial system and eliminate “Too-Big-to-Fail.”
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The recent ￿nancial crisis exposed ￿ aws in the regulation of bank capital. At the start of
the crisis, there was consensus among U.S. regulatory o¢ cials that banks had strong capital
positions.1 Why did these substantial capital levels prove inadequate, leading the federal gov-
ernment to inject more capital into many banks? One explanation is that the crisis produced
sudden, extreme losses in bank asset values that rapidly depleted banks￿initially high levels of
capital. A compounding factor may have been the composition of bank capital. Signi￿cant
amounts of secondary capital were in the form of subordinated debt.2 If a bank fails, subordi-
nated debt provides a bu⁄er that protects bank depositors, and therefore the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), from asset value losses. However since subordinated debt adds
to a bank￿ s leverage, it does not reduce the likelihood of ￿nancial distress when asset values and
primary shareholders￿equity capital decline.
Indeed, during the crisis investors gauged a bank￿ s strength as a going concern based on
its ￿tangible common equity￿ ratio, a capital ratio that excludes subordinated debt. More-
over, because the federal government considered some ￿nancial institutions either too big, too
complex, or too interconnected to fail (TBTF), it contributed new capital when they became
￿nancially distressed, negating subordinated debt￿ s loss-absorbing role at failure. To rectify this
shortcoming, a new type of ￿contingent capital￿has been proposed that would decrease TBTF
government assistance by reducing the likelihood of ￿nancial distress. Contingent capital takes
the form of debt that automatically converts to additional common shareholders￿equity when a
bank￿ s original shareholders￿equity is depleted. Banks may prefer to issue contingent capital,
rather than an equivalent amount of common shareholders￿equity, because contingent capital￿ s
status as debt makes it tax-advantaged.3
The goal of this paper is to analyze how contingent capital￿ s contractual terms and the risk of
1For example, in September 5, 2007 testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Com-
mittee, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chair Sheila Bair stated ￿Because insured ￿nancial institutions
entered this period of uncertainty with strong earnings and capital, they are in a better position both to absorb
the current stresses and to provide much needed credit as other sources withdraw....As the current period of
￿nancial stress began, both the banking industry and the deposit insurance system were sound.￿ In an October
15, 2007 speech to the Economic Club of New York, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke stated ￿Fortu-
nately, the ￿nancial system entered the episode of the past few months with strong capital positions and a robust
infrastructure. The banking system is healthy.￿
2As of June 2007, suborinated debt equaled 2.2% of total assets and equity capital equaled 8.4 % of total assets
for the 20 largest domestic bank holding companies. These are book value ￿gures from Y-9C Reports.
3Coupons paid on contingent capital would be deductible from income prior to the calculation of the bank￿ s
corporate income taxes whereas dividends paid to shareholders are not. In the absence of major corporate tax
reform that would eliminate the disincentive to issue shareholders￿equity, contingent capital may be a second-best
solution for mitigating this tax distortion and improving ￿nancial stability. The alternatives of simply requiring
banks to hold more common shareholders￿equity capital or of taxing bank debt might worsen other distortions.
Speci￿cally, higher corporate taxes paid by banks create incentives to excessively securitize bank loans. Han
et al. (2010) provide theory and empirical evidence for this distortion.
1its issuing bank a⁄ect its value and, therefore, the yields that contingent capital investors would
require. The paper also explores the risk-taking incentives of banks that issue di⁄erent forms
of contingent capital and compares them to the risk-taking incentives of banks that issue non-
convertible subordinated debt. The forms of contingent capital that are investigated are those
proposed by Flannery (2005), Flannery (2009b), and McDonald (2009) for which conversion is
tied to the market value of the bank￿ s shareholders￿equity. Conversion of contingent capital into
new shareholders￿equity would occur automatically when the market value of the issuing bank￿ s
original shareholders￿equity falls below a pre-speci￿ed threshold level.4 Contingent capital
would pay coupons and have a ￿xed maturity such that if the value of the bank￿ s original
shareholders￿equity did not breach the threshold, contingent capital would mature and could
be rolled over into a new issue of contingent capital.
Contingent capital is analyzed in the context of a structural credit risk model of a individual
bank. Importantly, the bank￿ s assets may su⁄er sudden losses in value as might occur during
a ￿nancial crisis. Speci￿cally, the returns on the bank￿ s assets are assumed to follow a jump-
di⁄usion process. The bank funds these assets by issuing three types of claims: short-term
deposits; common shareholders￿equity; and bonds in the form of contingent capital or subor-
dinated debt. The model captures other arguably realistic characteristics of banks, such as
their ability to increase (decrease) their deposit borrowing and leverage as their capital rises
(declines).5 It also permits the term structure of default-free interest rates to be stochastic and
allows coupons paid by contingent capital (prior to possible conversion) to be either ￿xed rate or
￿ oating rate. Di⁄erent capital thresholds at which contingent capital converts are considered.
Contingent capital also can convert to shareholders￿equity at a discount to face (par) value, a
contract feature that Flannery (2009a) and McDonald (2009) argue would reduce short-sellers￿
incentives to manipulate the bank￿ s stock price.
The model leads to a simple formula for the fair credit spread that the bank pays on its
deposits. This is possible because deposits are modeled as having a short (instantaneous)
maturity, and therefore depositors can su⁄er losses only if the bank￿ s assets decline suddenly.
The simplifying assumption of short-term deposits is not unrealistic, particularly for large banks
that are approaching ￿nancial distress. During the recent ￿nancial crisis, credit risk fears limited
many large banks to wholesale deposit funding having very short (overnight) maturities. Hence,
the model￿ s derived deposit credit spread can be realistically interpreted as the bank￿ s spread
on overnight LIBOR borrowing.
The value of bonds in the form of contingent capital or subordinated debt is calculated using
the Monte Carlo valuation approach pioneered by Boyle (1977). This is done by simulating two
4A related proposal that entails more regulatory discretion is Squam Lake Working Group (2009).
5Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) develop a structural credit risk model characterized by a mean-reverting
leverage ratio and argue that it better ￿ts corporate credit spreads. Adrian and Shin (2010) document that large
￿nancial institutions follow similar behavior.
2correlated, risk-neutral stochastic processes: the jump-di⁄usion process for the bank￿ s assets and
the process for the instantaneous-maturity interest rate that determines the default-free term
structure. A bond￿ s value is found for a given ￿xed-coupon rate or ￿ oating-coupon spread.
By varying this rate or spread, one can determine the fair coupon rate or spread for which the
newly-issued bond is valued at par.
The paper￿ s ￿ndings con￿rm some conjectures of prior papers, such as Flannery (2005) and
Flannery (2009b). If a bank￿ s asset returns follow a pure di⁄usion process without jumps, and
￿xed-coupon contingent capital converts to shareholders￿equity at its par value, then contingent
capital￿ s new-issue yield-to-maturity (par coupon rate) equals a default-free par rate, such as
a Treasury bond yield. But since the possibility of conversion lowers contingent capital￿ s
e⁄ective maturity, contingent capital￿ s comparable default-free yield is less than that of its
stated maturity. Thus, if the term structure of default-free Treasury yields is upward sloping,
as it normally is, the yield on contingent capital will be less than that of an equivalent-maturity
Treasury bond.6 However, for the case of contingent capital that pays ￿ oating-rate coupons,
coupon credit spreads above the short-term, default-free interest rate always will be zero.
When, more realistically, the bank￿ s asset returns incorporate a jump process, contingent
capital that is speci￿ed to convert at its par value will have a yield that rises above default-
free yields. This positive credit spread is due to the potential losses that contingent capital
investors would su⁄er if a sudden decline in the bank￿ s asset value requires conversion at below
par value. An implication is that new issue credit spreads on contingent capital rise as the
bank￿ s total capital and the value its original shareholders￿equity declines. Credit spreads
on contingent capital also are higher the lower is the value of shareholders￿equity at which
conversion is speci￿ed to occur and the larger is the conversion discount from the bond￿ s par
value.7 The e⁄ect of requiring a decline in a ￿nancial stock price index for conversion, the ￿dual
price trigger￿feature proposed by McDonald (2009), is to make contingent capital more similar
to non-convertible subordinated debt.
The bene￿ts of contingent capital in reducing the likelihood of ￿nancial distress may be
partially o⁄set if the bank has the incentive to raise the risks of its assets￿returns so as to shift
risk from the bank￿ s original shareholders to contingent capital investors. If this occurs after
contingent capital is issued, value is transferred from contingent capital investors to the original
bank shareholders. The paper￿ s results show that, in general, a bank￿ s risk-shifting incentives
increase as bank capital declines, and these risk-shifting incentives are greater when contingent
capital is designed to convert at a discount from par value or convert at a lower shareholders￿
equity threshold. However, a bank￿ s risk-shifting incentives when it issues contingent capital
6For example, a contingent capital bond with a maturity of ￿ve years may have a coupon lower than that of
a ￿ve-year Treasury bond.
7Specifying conversion at a discount from par value leads to higher yields even in the absence of possible jumps
in the bank￿ s asset returns.
3tend to be less than those which would occur if the contingent capital were replaced with an
equivalent amount of subordinated debt. Thus, if the status quo is one where banks issue subor-
dinated debt, moral hazard may be reduced by substituting contingent capital for subordinated
debt.
The following is the plan of the paper. Section 2 introduces a structural model of a banking
￿rm that issues short-term deposits, longer-term (possibly convertible) bonds, and shareholders￿
equity. It discusses how fair credit spreads on deposits can be derived and how fair new-issue
coupon rates or spreads (yields-to-maturity) can be computed for contingent capital or subordi-
nated debt. This section also considers how one might best specify a contingent capital bond￿ s
conversion threshold (trigger). Section 3 gives the model￿ s results. It presents comparative
statics for the fair ￿xed-coupon yields or ￿ oating-coupon credit spreads of contingent capital
and subordinated debt under various assumptions regarding a bank￿ s risk and the contractual
terms of the bonds. It also examines the risk-taking incentives of a bank￿ s shareholders when
the bank issues di⁄erent forms of contingent capital or subordinated debt. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Structural Banking Model
This section presents a structural model of an individual bank whose market value of assets
follows a jump-di⁄usion process. The bank funds its assets with short-term deposits, longer-
term bonds, and shareholders￿equity. The bonds can take the form of contingent capital or
non-convertible subordinated debt. Albul et al. (2010) present an alternative structural model
for analyzing contingent capital. They extend the model of Leland (1994) to study a ￿nancial
￿rm￿ s choice of a straight bond, contingent capital, and shareholders￿equity in the presence
of corporate taxes and direct costs of bankruptcy.8 Their focus is on a ￿rm￿ s incentive to
issue contingent capital in the context of an optimal capital structure decision, and they also
investigate the incentives for stock price manipulation and risk-shifting.
The current paper￿ s model takes a bank￿ s initial capital structure as given and considers how
di⁄erent aspects of the bank￿ s risk and the contractual terms of its contingent capital a⁄ect the
yields required by investors as well as the risk-shifting incentives of the issuing bank.9 The
distinctive features of the model include: the possibility of jumps in the bank￿ s asset returns;
short-maturity deposits; stochastic interest rates; and mean-reverting leverage (capital ratios).
8Both the straight bond and contingent capital are assumed to be consol bonds (perpetuities).
9The overlap of the current paper with Albul et al. (2010) is primarily in the examination of risk-shifting
incentives. However, since the current paper￿ s model allows for the possibility of jump risk in the bank￿ s asset
returns, it draws some additional, distinct conclusions regarding risk-shifting incentives. Section 3.3 elaborates
on this issue.
42.1 Assumptions
The model￿ s assumptions relate to the bank￿ s assets and the types of securities that are issued
to fund them. Let us start by describing the assets￿rate of return process and then discuss the
bank￿ s various liabilities.
2.1.1 Bank Assets
A bank￿ s assets are invested in a portfolio of loans, securities, and o⁄-balance sheet positions
whose rate of return follows a mixed jump-di⁄usion process. The date t value of this asset
portfolio is denoted At. The change in the quantity of bank assets equals the assets￿return
plus changes due to cash in￿ ows less cash out￿ ows. The sources of in￿ ows and out￿ ows from
bank assets will be speci￿ed shortly, but for now the superscript ￿ is used to distinguish asset
changes solely due to their rate of return, not including changes due to net cash in￿ ows. Thus,
the instantaneous rate of return that the bank earns on its assets is denoted as dA￿
t=A￿
t. Under










Note that dz is a standard Brownian motion process under the risk-neutral measure and qt is




1 if a jump occurs
0 otherwise
(2)
During each time interval, dt, the risk-neutral probability that qt augments by 1 is ￿t dt, where
￿t is the risk-neutral Poisson intensity. fYngn2N is a sequence of random variables such when




where Yqt￿ is a random variable realized at date t. Thus, if Yqt￿ is greater (less) than one, there
is an upward (downward) jump in the value of the bank￿ s assets. De￿ne kt ￿ E
Q
t [Yqt￿ ￿ 1] as
the risk-neutral expected proportional jump in the value of the assets given that a Poisson event
occurs. Assuming that the risk-neutral jump probability and jump intensity are independent,




dqt over the time
interval dt is ￿tkt dt.
The sample path of A￿
t for a process described by equation (1) will be continuous most of
the time, but can have ￿nite jumps of di⁄ering signs and amplitudes at discrete points in time,
5where the timing of the jumps depends on the Poisson random variable qt and the jump sizes
depend on the random variable Yqt￿. As in Du¢ e and Lando (2001), these jump events may
be interpreted as times when important information a⁄ecting the value of the assets is released.
2.1.2 Deposits
In addition to longer-term bonds and shareholders￿equity, deposits are one of the bank￿ s three
funding sources. The date t quantity of deposits is denoted Dt. Deposits are the most
senior claim and are assumed to have an instantaneous maturity; that is, they are short-term or
overnight sources of funding for the bank. Deposits pay a competitive return. Some deposits
may be fully insured by a government deposit insurer, such as the FDIC, that assesses an
instantaneous insurance premium per dollar of deposit, ht, that fairly re￿ ects its risk-neutral
expected insurance claims. In addition, the bank pays interest to the insured depositors at the
competitive, instantaneous-maturity default-free rate, rt . Other deposits may be uninsured
and are paid the competitive, default-free interest rate, rt, plus the fair credit risk premium, ht.
In either the case of insured or uninsured deposits, the bank is assumed to continuously pay out
total interest and deposit premiums of (rt + ht)Dtdt.
With interest and insurance premiums paid out continuously, the bank￿ s total quantity of
deposits changes only due to growth in net new deposits (deposit in￿ ows or out￿ ows), which
are not directly related to the accrual of interest and premiums. Because empirical evidence,
such as Adrian and Shin (2010), ￿nds that banks have target capital ratios and deposit growth
expands when banks have excess capital, the model assumes that deposit growth is positively
related to the bank￿ s current asset-to-deposit ratio, de￿ned as xt ￿ At=Dt. Speci￿cally,
dDt
Dt
= g (xt ￿ b x)dt (4)
where g is a positive constant and b x > 1 is a target asset-to-deposit ratio. When the actual
asset-to-deposit ratio exceeds its target, xt > b x, the bank issues positive amounts of net new
deposits. When xt < b x, the bank is gradually shrinking its balance sheet. Thus, the deposit
growth rate per unit time, g (xt ￿ b x), creates a mean-reverting tendency for the bank￿ s asset-to-
deposit ratio, xt.10
A bank failure, which leads to the deposit insurer taking control of the bank, is assumed
to occur whenever the value of the bank￿ s assets falls to or below the value of total deposits.11
That is, failure is the date tf at which Atf ￿ Dtf for the ￿rst time, equivalent to xtf ￿ 1. When
10It would be straightforward to allow net deposit growth to be stochastic; that is, the model could be generalized
to incorporate a separate Brownian motion process in equation (4).
11As discussed below, an exception to this closure policy is considered if the bank issues subordinated debt
rather than contingent capital. In this case, the bank is assumed to be closed whenever that value of bank assets
￿rst falls below the sum of the par values of both deposits and subordinated debt.
6failure occurs, the deposit insurer and the uninsured depositors are assumed to proportionally
share any loss which totals Dtf ￿ Atf.12
The assumptions that deposits have an instantaneous maturity and that a bank is closed
whenever the value of assets falls below the promised value of deposits imply that only Poisson
jumps can cause bank failure losses to depositors. These assumptions simplify the calculation of
the fair credit risk spread on deposits, ht, and they also simplify the valuation of the bank￿ s other
liabilities, including shareholders￿equity and contingent capital or subordinated debt. Because
deposits are fairly compensated for possible losses at any point in time, changes in bank capital
or the design of other liabilities will not shift value from or to depositors. This allows us to
examine how changes in capital, bond contract terms, and asset risk a⁄ect the relative values
of the bank￿ s other liabilities without having to consider value transfers to or from deposits.
Moreover, these assumptions regarding deposits may not be a gross departure from reality. For
many large banks, especially large banks nearing ￿nancial distress, wholesale deposits are indeed
typically of short maturity, often overnight Eurodollar deposits paying a rate close to overnight
LIBOR.
2.1.3 Contingent Capital
The bank￿ s longer-term bonds may take the form of contingent capital with a design similar
to that of Flannery (2009a). Let us consider this case ￿rst. Later, bonds in the form of
subordinated debt or contingent capital with the dual price trigger design of McDonald (2009)
are discussed.
Suppose that a contingent capital bond is issued at date 0 and matures at date T > 0. It has
a par (principal or face) value of B and continuously pays a coupon equal to ctBdt as long as the
bond is not converted or the bank has not failed. If the contingent capital bond is speci￿ed to
pay a ￿xed-rate coupon, then ct = c, a constant. If, instead, it has a ￿ oating-rate coupon, then
ct = rt +s, where s is a ￿xed spread over the short-term (instantaneous-maturity) interest rate.
The value of c or s is set at the time of issue (date 0) such that the bond￿ s equilibrium value
equals par, B. The bond does not convert (and the bank would not fail) as long as the bank￿ s
asset to deposit ratio, xt, stays above a pre-speci￿ed threshold conversion level, xt > 1, during
the period from 0 to T. Alternatively, the ￿rst time xt takes the value xt ￿ xt, say at date tc,
the contingent capital bond converts to common shareholders￿equity.13 This conversion occurs
12Rules guiding the resolution of U.S. bank failures require proportional sharing of losses by uninsured depositors
and the FDIC.
13Some contingent capital proposals allow for only part of the contingent capital to convert when a threshold
is breached. For simplicity, this model assumes that the entire amount of the bank￿ s contingent capital converts
to equity. Partial conversion introduces additional complications because the value of shareholders￿ equity
at conversion will depend on the value of unconverted contingent capital, making it more di¢ cult to specify
conversion values. However, the model is consistent with the assumption that the bank could be required to





pB if pB ￿ Atc ￿ Dtc
Atc ￿ Dtc if 0 < Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ pB
0 if Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ 0
(5)
= [Atc ￿ Dtc]
+ ￿ [Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ pB]
+
where the parameter p dictates the maximum conversion value of new shareholders￿equity per
par value of contingent capital. If p < 1 (p > 1), bonds are converted to equity at a discount
(premium) to their par value when the bank has su¢ cient capital; that is, when Atc ￿Dtc ￿ pB,
where At ￿ Dt is de￿ned as the bank￿ s total capital at date t.14 If capital is positive but
insu¢ cient for full conversion, pB ￿ Atc ￿ Dtc > 0, then contingent capital converts to an
amount of shareholders￿equity equal to remaining capital of Atc ￿ Dtc. If Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ 0,
the bank has failed and contingent capital holders receive nothing. Note that bank failure or
conversion at less than full value can result only following a downward jump in the bank￿ s asset
value that prevents full conversion.
2.1.4 Shareholders￿Equity
In addition to deposits and bonds, the bank receives funding from its initial shareholders￿equity,
whose date t value is denoted Et. If the bank￿ s bonds take the form of contingent capital and
the bank￿ s asset-to-deposit ratio never falls below xt during the period from 0 to T, then the
contingent capital never converts, the bank does not fail, and the value of original shareholders￿
equity is worth ET = AT ￿ B ￿ DT when the contingent capital is paid o⁄ in full at date T.15
Alternatively, the ￿rst time xt takes the value xt ￿ xt, which was denoted date tc, then the
value of the original shareholders￿equity equals
Etc =
(
Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ pB if pB < Atc ￿ Dtc
0 if Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ pB
(6)
= [Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ pB]
+
issue new fairly priced contingent capital after the old is converted. This requirement would have no e⁄ect on
the model￿ s valuation of existing contingent capital.
14The paper￿ s analysis focuses on conversion ratios p ￿ 1 since Flannery (2009a) and McDonald (2009) have
advocated setting p < 1 to prevent manipulation of the bank￿ s stock price in order to force conversion.
15As presented, the model assumes that no dividends are paid to shareholders. However, it is straightforward
to allow payment of a continuous dividend out of the bank￿ s assets, similar to the way that coupons on bonds
and interest on deposits are paid. For example, dividends might be a function of the bank￿ s asset-to-deposit
ratio, xt. The model￿ s qualitative results regarding the pricing of contingent capital and risk-taking incentives
would be little changed. Dividend payments would increase the rate at which the bank￿ s assets (and capital) are
depleted, thereby leading to somewhat higher fair coupon rates (yields) paid on bonds.
8Note that if contingent capital converts or matures, the total value of shareholders￿ equity
(including possibly converted contingent capital) equals the bank￿ s net worth or capital, At￿Dt.
At any time afterwards, new contingent capital can be issued at its fair value, B, without any
immediate change in the value of existing shareholders￿equity. Therefore, the model￿ s valuation
of existing contingent capital and shareholders￿equity is consistent with any fairly-priced new
issue of contingent capital that occurs after the existing issue converts or matures. Thus, the
model￿ s valuation of contingent capital and shareholders￿equity is consistent with a regulatory
requirement that new contingent capital must be issued following the current issue￿ s conversion or
maturity. Any subsequent ￿resetting￿of the bank￿ s capital structure, as long as any new security
issues are fairly priced, would not a⁄ect model￿ s valuation of the bank￿ s current liabilities.
2.1.5 Conversion Threshold
The model can accommodate di⁄erent speci￿cations of a conversion threshold or boundary, xt.
Suppose a conversion occurs at date th that is exactly at the threshold, so that xth = xth.
Such a conversion would follow a Brownian motion decline in asset value rather than a Poisson
jump that takes xt strictly below xt. One reasonable speci￿cation is for the threshold to
be in terms of a ￿xed ratio of assets to deposits (Ath=Dth = x), total capital to deposits
((Ath ￿ Dth)=Dth = x ￿ 1), or total capital to assets ((Ath ￿ Dth)=Ath = 1 ￿ 1=x), all of which
are e⁄ectively equivalent. A slightly di⁄erent speci￿cation would be to state these ratios in
terms of capital excluding the par value of contingent capital, such as (Ath ￿ B ￿ Dth)=Dth or
(Ath ￿ B ￿ Dth)=Ath.16
However, in practice, the bank￿ s asset value or market value of capital is not directly ob-
servable. What is observable is the market value of original shareholders￿equity, Et, as well
as the par values of contingent capital, B, and deposits, Dt. Hence, it is possible to restate
an asset or capital ratio threshold in terms of shareholders￿equity if we know the relationship
of shareholders￿equity to assets at the conversion threshold. This relationship is given by the
￿rst line in equation (6). For example, a threshold stated in terms of the ratio of the market





Ath ￿ Dth ￿ pB
Dth
= xth ￿ 1 ￿ pbth (7)
where bt ￿ B=Dt is the ratio of the contingent capital￿ s par value to the date t value of deposits.
The equity threshold (7) is equivalent to the asset-to-deposit threshold of xth = 1+ e + pbth.
16As of this writing, there have been two banks that have issued a type of contingent capital in exchange for
non-convertible bank bonds, Lloyds Banking Group and Yorkshire Building Society. In each case the conversion
trigger was in terms of a capital-to-asset ratio that excluded contingent capital, namely, a 5% Tier 1 capital asset
ratio. However, this conversion threshold was in book value, rather than market value, terms.
9For example, if p = 1, bth = 4%, e = 2%, the conversion threshold would be when original
shareholders￿equity had fallen to 2% of deposits, at which time contingent capital would convert
to new equity worth 4% of deposits, so that total capital would be worth 6% of deposits, or
assets worth 1.06% of deposits. If e = 2%, bth = 4%, but p = 0:9, so that contingent capital
converts at a discount to par value, equal to new equity worth 3.6% of deposits, then total
capital would be worth 5.6%, or total assets would be worth 1.056% of assets.
All else equal, if a threshold is stated in terms of the market value of original shareholders￿
equity and contingent capital converts at a discount to face value, the resulting total capital
will be less than if the conversion was at par value. To correct for this, it may make sense to
raise e to be higher for the case when contingent capital converts at a discount relative to the
no-discount case. Thus, in the above example if ep=1 = 2%, then ep=0:9 = 2:4%. Making this
adjustment, the conversion threshold would always be at the point where assets are 1.06% of
deposits.
The next section￿ s comparative analysis makes such an adjustment to keep the total capital
to deposit threshold approximately equal for di⁄erent contingent capital conversion discounts.
Thus, the chosen original shareholders￿equity to deposit threshold that is set when the contingent
capital is issued equals
ep = ep=1 + (1 ￿ p)
B
D0
= ep=1 + (1 ￿ p)b0 (8)
which is equivalent to the asset to deposit threshold of17
xth = 1 + ep=1 + b0 + p(bth ￿ b0) (9)
Another rationale for making this adjustment is that when contingent capital converts at a
discount to par, conversion should occur at a level of total capital exceeding the full face value
of contingent capital: Ath ￿ Dth > B, or xth > 1 + bth. Doing so prevents situations where
contingent capital has not converted but there is insu¢ cient total capital to pay o⁄ its full face
value of B at maturity.18
17If as in (8) the original shareholders￿equity-to-deposit threshold, ep, is constant, then (9) shows that xth is
time varying. It would be a constant, equal to 1 + ep=1 + b0 if bank deposits did not vary over time; that is
bth = B=Dth = b0 = B=D0. Since it realistic to permit mean-reversion in capital ratios by allowing deposit
issuance to vary, allowing for a time-varying asset-to-deposit ratio conversion threshold would appear to be
important given that issuance of new contingent capital (which would change B) would not occur as frequently
as new issuance of deposits.
18Based on (9), such situations would not occur as long as ep=1 > (bt ￿ b0)(1 ￿ p). Because bt is random,
such situations cannot be completely ruled out when p < 1. The problem would arise when deposits decline so
signi￿cantly that the ratio of equity to deposits remains above the threshold but the bank￿ s total capital shrinks
below B. For example, if ep=1 = 2%, b0 = 4%, and p = 0:9, then the value of bt for which this inequality would
not hold would be bt = 24%. That would represent a 83% decline in deposits, which is probably outside the
realm of possibility for a bank that has not yet failed.
10If conversion does occur at the threshold value of original shareholders equity of Eth = eDth,
and if there are N original shares of stock, so that eDth=N is the price per share, then contingent
capital worth pB would convert to pB=(eDth=N) = pBN=(eDth) new shares.
If there is a downward jump in asset and equity values such that xt < xt or Et < eDt, it may
or may not be possible to issue su¢ cient new shares to make the market value of contingent
capital equal pB. If upon issuance of shares equal to pBN=Et, the value of contingent capital
equals its full conversion value of pB, then the original shareholders retain a positive stake in
the bank. However, if upon issuance of pBN=Et shares, the price per share falls to close to
zero, this would indicate that contingent capital cannot be converted in full and the original
shareholders￿stake must be wiped out. If, after giving the previous contingent capital holders
full ownership of the bank, the new market value of total equity is very small, this should signal
to regulators that there may have been a large enough loss in asset value that capital may even
be negative. Such an event should trigger an examination of the bank to determine whether it
should be closed.19
2.1.6 Subordinated Debt
Rather than contingent capital, suppose that a bank￿ s longer-term bonds take the form of
non-convertible, subordinated debt. Using the model to value subordinated debt is useful for
comparing the risk-taking incentives of a bank that issues contingent capital to one issuing
standard subordinated debt. For this reason, consider how the model￿ s assumptions change
when subordinated debt replaces contingent capital. Similar to contingent capital, subordinated
debt can be issued at date 0 having a par value of B, a time until maturity of T, and ￿xed or
￿ oating coupons paid out continuously. Suppose that regulators close the bank when assets
equal or fall below the total par value of debt, equal to the par value of subordinated debt and





Atc ￿ Dtc if 0 < Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ B
0 if Atc ￿ Dtc ￿ 0
(10)
If assets remain above the par values of deposits and subordinated debt, the bank continues to
make coupon payments until the bond matures at date T.
19Another indication of whether the bank is still viable would be if it can now issue new contingent capital,
which is possible only if current capital is non-negative.
20One could assume that regulators do not intervene to close the bank until at least some portion of the
subordinated debt is wiped out. For example, the closure rule might be At ￿ ￿B +Dt, where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Such a
closure rule would make the subordinated debt even more risky since losses could occur even without a downward
jump in asset value.
112.1.7 Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger
The bank￿ s longer-term bonds could take a third general form. As proposed by McDonald
(2009), contingent capital with a dual price trigger modi￿es the design of Flannery (2009b) to
impose an additional condition for conversion. Not only must the bank￿ s shareholders￿equity
fall below a threshold, but an index of ￿nancial ￿rms￿stocks must also breach a pre-speci￿ed
threshold. The motivation for including this second condition is to permit conversion, so that a
bank remains a going concern, only during a general ￿nancial crisis. Instead, if the contingent
capital-issuing bank is performing badly while other ￿nancial institutions are not, conversion
would not occur and the bank could fail. Thus, dual price trigger contingent capital acts like the
contingent capital of Flannery (2009b) in a crisis situation but acts like standard subordinated
debt in a non-crisis situation.
Let It be the date t value of a ￿nancial stock index, and let It be the pre-speci￿ed threshold
required for conversion. Thus, only if It ￿ It and xt ￿ xt would full or partial conversion to
shareholders equity occur as in equation (5). If It > It even though 1 + pbt < xt ￿ xt, there
is no conversion and the bond continues to pay coupons. If xt ￿ 1 + pbt then regulators are
assumed to close the bank and the bond￿ s liquidation value satis￿es equation (10).21
The risk-neutral process for the ￿nancial stock index is assumed to satisfy
dIt=It = rtdt + ￿idzi (11)
where ￿i is a constant and dzi is a Brownian motion that is correlated with the individual bank￿ s
asset return Brownian motion, dz.22
Having completed a description of the bank￿ s assets and liabilities, the model￿ s remaining
assumption involves the interest rate environment.
2.1.8 Default-Free Term Structure
The model can accommodate di⁄erent speci￿cations of the default-free term structure. Modeling
stochastic interest rates is important for distinguishing between ￿xed versus ￿ oating coupons
paid by contingent capital or subordinated debt. For concreteness, consider the term structure
21Note that for the case of p < 1, so that conversion would occur at a discount to par, it is assumed that
regulators would not close the bank until At ￿ pB + Dt, rather than At ￿ B + Dt. The logic is that when
pB +Dt < At ￿ B +Dt, there is still the possibility that full conversion at pB may occur in the future if It later
falls below It. However, the model assumes that at maturity an unconverted contingent capital bond will lead to
a failure whenever At ￿ B + Dt since there is insu¢ cient asset value to pay the bond￿ s par value of B.
22At the expense of additional parameters, it is straightforward to generalize the index return process (11) to
include a Poisson jump component that could be correlated with the individual bank￿ s Poisson jump process.
The quantitative e⁄ect may be to make conversion more likely, but qualitatively the results will be similar.
12speci￿cation of Cox et al. (1985) where the risk-neutral process followed by the instantaneous
default-free interest rate, rt, is23
drt = ￿(r ￿ rt)dt + ￿r
p
rtd￿ (12)
and where d￿ is a Brownian motion process such that d￿dz = ￿dt. This process implies that
the date t price of a default-free, zero-coupon bond that pays $1 in ￿ ￿ T ￿ t years is




















r. De￿ne cr as the coupon rate of a default-free bond that pays a continuous
coupon of crFdt, matures in ￿ years, and is issued at a market price equal to its par value, F.









i=1 A(￿t ￿ i)e￿B(￿t￿i)rt￿t
where n = ￿=￿t.
2.2 Credit Spreads on Deposits
Given the risk-neutral distribution of asset returns, it is straightforward to solve for the fair
deposit insurance premium or deposit credit risk premium, ht, as a function of the current asset
to deposit ratio, xt. Since the bank is assumed to be closed by the deposit insurer whenever
xt ￿ 1, if xt reaches 1 following a continuous movement in the bank assets, the bank is closed
with Atb = Dt and depositors su⁄er no loss. Therefore, depositors experience losses only
following a downward jump in asset value that exceeds the bank￿ s capital, including contingent










P +   and r = r
P￿
P=￿ and   is a parameter re￿ ecting the price of interest rate risk. Empirical evidence
suggests that   is negative, so that r > r
P.
13capital if it has not yet converted or subordinated debt.24 If such a jump does occur at date
b t, the instantaneous proportional loss to deposits is
￿
Dt ￿ Yqb t￿Ab t￿
￿
=Dt. At any point in time,
the credit risk premium on the instantaneous-maturity deposits, ht, must re￿ ect the risk-neutral
expectation of such a loss. Thus, the risk-neutral rate of return process for deposits equals
dD￿




















To calculate ht, additional assumptions regarding the risk-neutral frequency of jumps and
the distribution of jumps sizes are required. Speci￿cally, let us assume that ￿t = ￿, a constant,












and therefore kt ￿ E
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t [Yqt￿ ￿1] = e￿y+ 1
2￿2



















d2 = d1 + ￿y
Since ht changes continuously with the asset-to-deposit ratio, xt, while the bank remains in
operation, depositors always receive fair compensation for their risk of loss and the value of
deposits always equals their par value of Dt.
24The formula for ht as a function of xt is unchanged if, for the case of subordinated debt, the regulatory closure
threshold is At ￿ Dt +B, rather than At ￿ Dt. In either case, for any bank currently in operation, a downward
jump in asset value is necessary for depositors to su⁄er a loss.
25With little additional complexity, an additional state variable could be introduced to change the jump pa-
rameters. This state variable might be tied to aggregate uncertainty measures, such as the S&P 500 volatility
index, VIX.
142.3 Valuing Contingent Capital
Consider a bank that issues deposits, contingent capital, and shareholders￿equity. Because
deposit credit spreads adjust continuously to fairly compensate depositors for potential losses,
the date t sum of contingent capital and original shareholders￿equity always equals total capital,
At ￿ Dt, as long as capital is non-negative. As a result, if the value of contingent capital can
be derived, the value of original shareholders￿equity equals the residual capital. Moreover, any
changes in the model￿ s state variables (xt and rt) transfers value only between contingent capital
investors and shareholders, not depositors.
Recall that the model assumes that contingent capital is issued at date 0 having a value, V0,
equal to its par value, B. Thus, at issue, the contingent capital￿ s ￿xed-coupon rate, c, or its
￿ oating-coupon spread, s, is set such that V0 = B. The equilibrium coupon rate or spread is
found by valuing contingent capital for a given coupon rate or spread and then iterating over c
or s until one ￿nds the value c￿ or s￿ such that V0 = B. c￿ or s￿ will then be the fair coupon
rate or spread at the contingent capital￿ s issue date. Accordingly, the date 0 value of original
shareholders￿equity is simply E0 = A0 ￿ B ￿ D0.
Valuing contingent capital for a given coupon rate or spread is carried out using the risk-












where v (t) is the contingent capital bond￿ s cash￿ ow per unit time paid at date t. The cash￿ ow
equals ctB as long as the bond is not converted or the bank does not fail, where ct = c for
a ￿xed-coupon bond and ct = rt + s for a ￿ oating coupon bond. If at date T the bond has
not been converted and the bank has not failed, there is a ￿nal cash￿ ow of B. If the bond
is converted, say at date tc, there is the one-time cash￿ ow given by equation (5). Thereafter,
v (t) = 0 for all t > tc.
Given the bank￿ s initial asset and deposit values, A0 and D0, respectively, as well as the initial
default-free interest rate, r0, equation (21) can be computed using the Monte Carlo simulation
technique of Boyle (1977). The risk-neutral process followed by the bank￿ s assets equals the
assets￿risk-neutral rate of return less the payout of interest and premiums to depositors and, as
long as contingent capital is unconverted, coupons to contingent capital investors:
























(rt ￿ ￿k) ￿
rt + ht + ctbt
xt
￿





Making the change in variables xt = At=Dt and recalling the deposit growth process in equation











(rt ￿ ￿k) ￿
rt + ht + ctbt
xt
￿ g (xt ￿ b x)
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A simple application of It￿￿ s lemma for jump-di⁄usion processes implies
dln(xt) =
￿
(rt ￿ ￿k) ￿
rt + ht + ctbt
xt





dt + ￿ dz + lnYqt￿ dqt (25)
For a given coupon structure, ct, the risk-neutral processes for the default-free interest rate rt
in equation (12) and the log asset to deposit ratio in equation (25) can be simulated where ht
at each point in time satis￿es (20) and bt = B=Dt evolves as
dbt=bt = g (b x ￿ xt)dt. (26)
By computing the term in brackets in (21) for each simulation and then averaging over a large
number of simulations, the contingent capital￿ s initial value, V0, is determined. The equilibrium
coupon rate, c, or coupon spread, s, is found by iterating until V0 = B.
Speci￿cally, solutions for the valuation equation (21) are calculated using a technique similar
to Zhou (2001) who provides a discretization method for carrying out a Monte Carlo simulation
of a mixed jump-di⁄usion process. His method is generalized to also consider the stochastic
term structure of default-free yields. The time interval [0;T] is divided into n equal sub-periods
where ￿t ￿ T=n is the length of each subperiod. The number n is chosen to be relatively large,
making the length of each subperiod, ￿t, su¢ ciently small so that it is a good approximation
to assume there can be at most one jump during each subperiod. For example, with time
measured in years, then ￿t = 1
250 can be set at one trading day. This is the time interval used
in the analysis presented in the next section.
Let t denote the end of trading day t ￿ ￿t and the beginning of trading day t. Then based
on equation (12), the change in the default-free interest rate from day t to day t + ￿t can be
16approximated as





= ￿t￿r + (1 ￿ ￿t￿)rt + ￿r
p
rt￿t￿t+￿t
where ￿t+￿t ￿ N (0;1) are serially independent shocks representing Brownian motion uncer-
tainty. Similarly, the daily risk-neutral process for the log of the bank￿ s asset to deposit ratio,
equation (25) is approximated as
lnxt+￿t = lnxt +
￿
(rt ￿ ￿tkt) ￿
rt + ht + cbt
xt








￿t"t+￿t + lnYt+￿t’t+￿t (28)















1 with probability ￿t￿t
0 with probability 1 ￿ ￿t￿t
; (29)
ht is given by (20), and
bt+￿t = bt exp[￿g (xt ￿ b x)￿t]: (30)
2.4 Valuing Subordinated Debt
If a bank issues subordinated debt rather than contingent capital, the valuation process is similar.
Subordinated debt is paid a continuous coupon ctBdt unless the bank is closed, with closure
occurring whenever xt ￿ 1 + bt, where bt = B=Dt is now the ratio of the subordinated debt￿ s
par value to the par value of deposits: As with contingent capital, by varying the ￿xed coupon
rate, c, or the ￿ oating coupon spread, s, the initial value of subordinated debt is varied until
one ￿nds the coupon rate or spread such that its initial value equals par, B.
2.5 Valuing Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger
Valuing contingent capital with a dual price trigger requires an additional state variable, lnIt,
in the Monte Carlo simulation such that











where ￿t+￿t ￿ N (0;1) are serially independent shocks that are cross-sectionally correlated with
the "t+￿t and ￿t+￿t shocks driving the individual bank￿ s asset returns and the default-free term
17structure. Dual price trigger contingent capital is paid a coupon ctBdt until either conversion
occurs or the bank is closed. Assuming It = ￿I0, where ￿ < 1, conversion would occur at the
￿rst instance when both It ￿ ￿I0 and xt ￿ xt, and its conversion value would equal equation
(5). If It > It, the bank remains in operation until xt ￿ 1+pbt, at which time it is closed and
the terminal value of contingent capital equals equation (10). If maturity occurs before closure
or conversion, the contingent capital bond￿ s terminal value equals min[B;AT ￿ DT].
3 Results
To examine how contract terms a⁄ect valuation and the bank￿ s risk-taking incentives, this section
computes model values for a given set of benchmark parameters. The parameters of the default-
free term structure are similar to those estimated by Duan and Simonato (1999) and equal
￿ = 0:114, ￿r = 0:07, and r = 0:069. The initial (date 0) instantaneous-maturity interest rate
is assumed to be r0 = 3:5%: These assumptions produce an upward sloping term structure such
that the fair default-free coupon (par) rate for a ￿ve-year maturity coupon bond given by cr in
equation (16) equals 4:23%.
Ideally, parameters of the bank￿ s asset return jump-di⁄usion process might be estimated
from information on a bank￿ s stock returns, debt prices, and/or credit default swap spreads.
Unfortunately, there appears to be no prior research carrying out such an estimation, and
performing this exercise is left to future research. The current paper simply assumes what
might be reasonable benchmark parameters: ￿ = 0:02, ￿ = ￿0:2, ￿ = 1, ￿y = ￿0:01, and
￿y = 0:02. In words, the bank￿ s asset returns have an annual standard deviation deriving
from Brownian motion uncertainty of ￿ = 2%. These Brownian motion returns are negatively
correlated changes in short-term interest rates with correlation coe¢ cient ￿ = ￿0:2.26 The
risk-neutral frequency of jumps, ￿, is once per year and the risk-neutral mean jump size is ￿y =
-1% with a standard deviation of ￿y = 2%. If a bank has an equity-to-asset ratio of 10%, these
jump-di⁄usion parameter assumptions produce a standard deviation of bank stock returns of
approximately 35%.
3.1 Deposit Credit Spreads
Given the jump process parameters of ￿ = 1, ￿y = ￿0:01, and ￿y = 0:02 along with a given
ratio of assets to deposits, xt, the fair credit spread ht can be computed from equation (20).
Figure 1 plots the fair credit spread, in basis points, for various capital-to-deposit ratios, xt ￿1,
ranging from 0.5% to 10%. Schedule A is the credit spread for this benchmark parameter case.
26This is approximately the long-run daily correlation between Treasury bill yields and the S&P 500.
18As expected, the credit spread is inversely related to the capital-to-deposit ratio because lower
capital makes it more likely that a downward jump in asset value will wipe out the remaining
capital and cause a loss to depositors. Schedule B is the same as Schedule A except that the
volatility of jumps, ￿y, is increased from 2% to 3%. It can be seen that more volatile jumps
raise credit spreads at each level of capital. Schedule C deviates from the benchmark case by
changing the mean jump size, ￿y, from -1% to -2%, and this also leads to higher credit spreads,
particularly for low levels of capital. Finally, Schedule D raises the risk-neutral frequency of
jumps, ￿, from once per year to twice per year. As can be seen from equation (20), this simply
doubles the benchmark case credit spread for each level of capital.
3.2 Yields on Contingent Capital
This section presents fair, new issue yields for ￿xed-coupon contingent capital as well as fair
new issue spreads for ￿ oating-rate contingent capital. In addition to the benchmark parameters
described earlier, it is assumed that the bank has a target capital to deposit ratio of 10%; that is,
b x = 1:10. Moreover, the mean-reversion parameter for bank deposit growth is g = 0:5, implying
that when the bank￿ s capital ratio deviates from target, the expected reduction in the deviation
over the next year is approximately one half.
The benchmark contingent capital bond is assumed to have a ￿ve-year maturity (￿ = 5)
and a new issue amount (par value) equal to 4% of deposits (b0 = 0:04). Thus, if the bank is
initially at its 10% target capital ratio, 4% is contingent capital and 6% is original shareholders￿
equity. This benchmark bond is speci￿ed to convert at par (p = 1) when the market value of
original shareholders￿equity falls to 2% of deposits; that is, e = 2%. Hence, using the conversion
threshold rule discussed earlier of xth = 1+ e + pbth, conversion of this benchmark bond will
tend to occur when total capital is approximately 6% or less of deposits.
3.2.1 Jumps and Mean-Reversion of Capital Ratios
Figure 2 gives the new issue yields for ￿xed-coupon contingent capital, c, when the bank￿ s initial
total capital ranges from 6.5% to 15%. Recall that the default-free term structure is assumed
to have an initial instantaneous maturity interest rate of r0 equal to 3.5% and the par yield on
a ￿ve-year Treasury coupon bond is 4.23%. This 4.23% default-free, ￿ve-year par yield is given
by the dashed line denoted Schedule A in the ￿gure. In comparison, Schedule B of Figure 2
shows that the benchmark contingent capital bond￿ s new issue yield is 5.41%, 4.56%, and 4.39%
when initial capital is 6.5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.
This contingent capital bond￿ s yield spread above the ￿ve-year Treasury is due to the possi-
bility that it could convert at less than par following a downward jump in the bank￿ s asset (and
19equity) value. If all of the benchmark parameters are maintained except one assumes there is
no possibility of jumps (￿ = 0), then the contingent capital bond￿ s spreads over the ￿ve-year
Treasury yield would not be positive. Indeed, given the assumption of an upward-sloping term
structure, Schedule C of Figure 2 shows that spreads would be slightly negative. Since conver-
sion lowers the e⁄ective maturity of contingent capital and, without jumps, it always converts
at par, it is e⁄ectively a default-free bond with a maturity of less than ￿ve years. Hence, its
yield is more like a that of a shorter-term default-free bond, which is below the ￿ve-year default-
free yield. Thus, one sees that the possibility of jumps in the bank￿ s asset value, as might
occur during a ￿nancial crisis, has a qualitatively important impact on the pricing of contingent
capital.
Schedule D of Figure 2 maintains the benchmark bond￿ s parameters except that the mean-
reversion parameter for bank deposit growth is lowered from g = 0:5 to g = 0:25. Such a bank is
slower to adjust deposits in order to move toward its target capital to deposit ratio of 10%. The
e⁄ect is to raise new issue yields when the bank has low capital but lower them when the bank has
high capital. The intuition for this result is that if the bank starts out undercapitalized, slower
capital ratio reversion tends to keep it undercapitalized for a longer time, thereby increasing
opportunities where a downward jump in asset value could require conversion at less than par.
In contrast, if the bank starts out overcapitalized, slower capital ratio reversion tends to keep it
overcapitalized for a longer time, reducing the likelihood that a downward jump in asset value
could require conversion at less than par.
3.2.2 Maturity
Figure 3 examines how new issue yields for ￿xed-coupon contingent capital vary by maturity.
The dashed-line Schedules A, B, and C give the default-free par coupon rates for 3-, 5-, and
10-year Treasury bonds, which are 3.99%, 4.23%, and 4.64%, respectively. Schedules D, E,
and F then show the new issue yields for contingent capital having the benchmark parameters
except that their times until maturity are 3 years, 5 years, and 10 years, respectively.27 When
the bank has high capital, the yields on contingent capital bonds approach the default-free yields
for their respective maturities. However, when capital is low, the contingent capital bonds have
more similar yields because with conversion a signi￿cant possibility, they are valued more as
shareholders￿equity than as default-free bonds. When capital is 7.5% of deposits or less, their
yields converge in the 5% to 5.6% range, due to having similar high probabilities of experiencing
a downward jump in asset value that could require conversion at less than par. Note that when
capital is low and the likelihood of conversion losses are high, the contingent capital bonds￿
spreads over their respective default-free Treasury yields are a decreasing function of maturity,
27Schedules B and E for the benchmark ￿ve-year maturity are the same as those in Figure 2.
20a result consistent with other structural models, such as Merton (1974).28
3.2.3 Conversion Terms
Figure 4 considers how a contingent capital bond￿ s conversion features a⁄ect its new issue yields.
Schedules A and B are repeated from Figure 2 and are the ￿ve-year default-free par yield and
the par yield on the benchmark contingent capital bond where p = 1 and e = 2%. Schedule
C gives the new issue par yield for ￿ve-year contingent capital having conversion speci￿ed to
equal 90% of par value; that is p = 0:9 and e = 2:4%.29 Notably, the fair coupon rate for
contingent capital that converts at a discount is signi￿cantly higher than the benchmark case,
particularly for bonds issued when bank capital is low. The higher yield due to the conversion
discount is not dependent on asset value jumps. Because the conversion discount imposes losses
on bondholders, yields would be above the default-free yield even if bank assets followed a pure
di⁄usion process.
Also in Figure 4, a ￿ve-year contingent capital bond that converts at full value (p = 1) but
at a smaller equity threshold of e = 1% is given in Schedule D. In this case, conversion occurs
at or below a total capital ratio threshold of 5%, so new issue yields are graphed over the capital
to deposit ratios of 5.5% to 15%. Importantly, this contingent capital bond￿ s yields are higher
than the benchmark p = 1, e = 2% case because the smaller 1% equity cushion makes it more
likely that a downward jump in asset value can occur that would prevent full conversion. In
other words, for the benchmark contingent capital bond, at a point just before conversion, there
would need to be a sudden asset value loss exceeding 2% to prevent full conversion, while for
the contingent capital bond with e = 1%, at a point just before conversion, there would need to
be a sudden asset value loss only slightly more than 1% for bondholders to sustain a conversion
loss. This ￿nding has implications for recent regulatory proposals that would have contingent
capital convert only when a bank was in dire straits and close to being seized by regulators.30
Delaying conversion to a point when the value of original shareholders￿equity is low raises the
new issue yields on contingent capital.
28For example, at 6.5% capital, the contingent capital bond spreads over equivalent maturity default-free yields
are 162, 117, and 80 basis points for maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years. The inverse spread maturity relationship
holds for bonds with relatively high default risk. In contrast, Merton (1974) ￿nds a hump-shaped yield-maturity
relationship for bonds with relatively low default risk. This is also true in our model￿ s example, since at 15%
capital, the contingent capital bonds￿spreads over equivalent maturity default-free yields are 15, 16, and 9 basis
points for maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years, respectively.
29Recall that if contingent capital converts at a discount to face value, the resulting total capital will be less
than if the conversion was at face value. To correct for this, use equation (8) to raise e to be higher for the
case when contingent capital converts at discount relative to the no-discount case; that is, if ep=1 = 2%, then
ep=0:9 = 2:4%. Making this adjustment, the conversion threshold would stay at the point were deposits are 1.06%
of assets.
30Canada￿ s superintendent of ￿nancial institutions, Julie Dickson, proposes that the conversion trigger for
contingent capital would be ￿when the regulator is ready to seize control of the institution because problems are
so deep that no private buyer would be willing to acquire shares in the bank.￿ Financial Times, April 9, 2010.
21The ￿nal Schedule E in Figure 3 gives the new issue yields on ￿xed-coupon, ￿ve-year subor-
dinated debt having an initial par value equal to 4% of deposits. Recall that it is assumed when
a bank issues subordinated debt, that regulators close the bank when assets fall to, or below,
the total of the par value of deposits plus subordinated debt. Thus, subordinated debt can be
viewed as similar to contingent capital with p = 1 but e = 0; that is, subordinated debt has no
equity conversion bu⁄er. This makes it more likely that a downward jump in asset value could
impose losses and explains why subordinated debt￿ s yields are higher than contingent capital
that converts at par (but not as high as contingent capital that converts at a discount).
Figure 5 performs similar analysis to that of Figure 4 but for ￿ oating-rate contingent cap-
ital. It graphs s, the new issue credit spread (over the instantaneous maturity interest rate)
for contingent capital bonds with di⁄erent conversion terms. Note that a zero credit spread
represents no default risk, and this is the equilibrium credit spread for all contingent capital
that convert at par (p = 1) if there were no possibility of jumps in asset returns. Hence, as with
the case of ￿xed-coupon contingent capital, positive spreads on ￿ oating-rate, par conversion,
contingent capital occur due to the possibility of sudden asset value losses that would prevent
full conversion. For example, for the benchmark contingent capital bond of p = 1 and e = 2%
given in Schedule A, the new issue ￿ oating rate spreads (over the instantaneous maturity rate)
are 141, 45, and 23 basis points for initial bank capital of 6.5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.
Figure 5 compares new issue spreads for ￿ oating-coupon contingent capital having di⁄erent
conversion features, and its results are nearly identical to those given for ￿xed-coupon yields in
Figure 4. One sees that a smaller equity conversion threshold (p = 1, e = 1%) raises spreads
as does a conversion discount (p = 0:9 and e = 2:4%). Also, ￿ oating-coupon subordinated debt
spreads are higher than contingent capital bonds except when conversion occurs at a discount.
3.2.4 After-Issue Values of Contingent Capital and Shareholders￿Equity
Thus far, the results have compared new issue yields and spreads. Now let us consider the pricing
of ￿ oating-coupon contingent capital and shareholders￿equity after the bonds are issued, so that
spreads are ￿xed prior to examining subsequent changes in capital.31 Figure 6 considers the
prices of contingent capital bonds that were issued at fair spreads when the bank￿ s capital to
deposit ratio equaled 10%, and then examines how prices change as the capital ratio declines.
The di⁄erent contingent capital bonds are the same ones considered earlier: Bond A converts at
par when equity is 2% of deposits (p = 1, e = 2%); Bond B converts at a 10% discount to par
when equity is 2.4% of deposits (p = 0:9 and e = 2:4%); and Bond C converts at par when equity
is 1% of deposits (p = 1, e = 1%). As can be seen from the ￿gure, all three of the bonds equal
31These valuations are done for ￿ oating-coupon contingent capital, but the results for ￿xed-coupon contingent
capital are nearly identical.
22their par value of 4% of deposits when total capital equals 10% of deposits. As the capital ratio
declines, the values of the three bonds tend to fall. However, at a capital ratio of 6.75%, Bond
A reaches its minimum value of 3.94%, while at a capital ratio of 5.75 %, Bond C researches its
minimum value of 3.85%. The values of these bonds then turn upward as each comes close to
its conversion threshold, which is 6.00% capital for Bond A and 5.00% capital for Bond C. The
intuition for this upturn in price is that it becomes relatively more likely that the bonds will
convert at par compared to below par. While the risk of a downward jump in asset value that
would prevent full conversion increases as capital declines, as capital approaches the threshold,
the likelihood of hitting the threshold via a continuous Brownian motion decline increases even
more quickly. If the threshold is hit in such a continuous manner, then the bond converts at its
par value of 4%, so that the price rises toward that level. Bond C, which converts when equity
is only 1% at the threshold, never rises as high as Bond A which converts when equity equals
2% at the threshold. This is because Bond C is exposed to a greater likelihood that a sudden
decline in asset value would prevent conversion at par.
Price dynamics are qualitatively di⁄erent for Figure 6￿ s Bond B which converts at a discount
to par value. This bond￿ s value declines at an increasing rate as the 6.00% capital ratio threshold
is approached. Conversion at the threshold for this bond would be at 0:90 ￿ 0:04% = 3:6% of
deposits, so that even a continuous decline in asset value would impose losses on the bondholders.
Recall that because credit spreads on deposits adjust instantaneously to the current level of
capital, deposits are always priced at par as long as capital is non-negative. Consequently, the
sum of the values of contingent capital and original shareholders￿equity must equal total capital,
At ￿ Dt. Therefore, subtracting the values of contingent capital bonds in Figure 6 from total
capital gives the corresponding equilibrium values of shareholders￿equity. These shareholders￿
equity values are graphed in Figure 7. Consistent with par conversion Bonds A and C having
slight upward rises in value as total capital declines to their respective 6% and 5% capital ratio
thresholds, the corresponding market values of equity in Schedules A and C decline at slightly
greater than one-for-one as capital approaches these thresholds. In contrast, because contingent
capital Bond B converts at a discount to par, making its value decline as capital approaches
its 6.00% conversion threshold, the corresponding value of shareholders￿equity declines at a
somewhat less than one-for-one rate as the conversion threshold is met. However, for each
Schedule A, B, and C, the equilibrium value of shareholders￿equity declines monotonically with
a fall in total capital and, from equation (6), their prices approach their full conversion values of
Etc = Atc￿Dtc￿pB, equal to 2% of deposits, 2.4% of deposits, and 1% of deposits, respectively.
233.2.5 Dual Price Conversion Trigger
Let us now consider the e⁄ects of one additional conversion feature, namely, the dual price
conversion trigger proposed by McDonald (2009). It is assumed that the ￿nancial stock index,
It, must fall at least 10% from its level at the time that contingent capital is issued; that is,
It = ￿I0 = 0:9I0. Similar to McDonald (2009), the volatility of the index￿ s return is assumed to
be ￿i = 20%, and the index return￿ s correlations with interest rate changes and the bank￿ s asset
return are dzid￿ = ￿0:2dt and dzidz = 0:85dt. Figure 8 compares new issue yields on ￿xed-
coupon contingent capital with, and without, the ￿nancial index trigger. As before, Schedule
A￿ s dashed line gives the par yield on a ￿ve-year Treasury bond while Schedule B repeats the
￿xed-coupon yields for the benchmark ￿ve-year, single trigger contingent capital bond (p = 1,
e = 2%). Schedule C is then the equivalent par-conversion contingent capital bond (p = 1,
e = 2%) except that it has the dual price trigger. As can be seen, its new issue yields are above
those of the standard single-trigger contingent capital. However, they are below the new issue
yields of subordinated debt graphed in Schedule D.
The logic behind this ordering of yields relates to the previously discussed bene￿t of an equity
cushion. Yields on standard single-trigger contingent capital (Schedule B) are lowest because
it is converted at par without loss to its holders when equity hits the 2% threshold. The
yields on subordinated debt (Schedule D) are highest because it completely lacks this equity
conversion cushion. Dual trigger, par-conversion, contingent capital is an intermediate case
because sometimes the equity cushion is e⁄ective in providing the protection resulting from par
conversion (when It ￿ It ), but other times it is not (when It > It). Thus, in some states of the
world, dual price trigger contingent capital acts like single price trigger contingent capital, but
in other states it acts like non-convertible subordinated debt. Hence, its initial pricing re￿ ects
a mix of both convertible and non-convertible debt.
Schedule E of Figure 8 repeats Figure 4￿ s new issue yields of single price trigger, ￿xed-coupon
contingent capital that converts at a discount (p = 0:9, e = 2:4%). Schedule F of Figure 8 then
gives the equivalent contingent capital but with a dual price trigger. Interestingly, for contingent
capital that converts at a discount, the impact of the dual price trigger is to lower, rather
than raise, yields. However, this should be expected because a discount from par now makes
conversion a costly feature for contingent capital investors. As in the par conversion case, when
conversion is at a discount the yields on contingent capital with a dual price trigger fall between
those of single price trigger contingent capital (Schedule E) and non-convertible subordinated
debt (Schedule D). In summary, one can understand the characteristics of dual price trigger
contingent capital by viewing it as a blend of standard, single price trigger contingent capital
and non-convertible subordinated debt.
243.3 Incentives for Risk-Taking
This section considers the risk-taking incentives of a bank that issues contingent capital by
investigating how changes in asset risk and capital ratios a⁄ect the relative values of contingent
capital and shareholders￿equity. Because credit spreads on short-maturity deposits adjust
instantly, changes in the bank￿ s risk does not a⁄ect their values. Hence, in the model if a bank
issues only deposits and shareholders￿equity, it would have no incentive or ability to transfer
value from depositors to shareholders by increasing risk. Shareholders￿equity would always
equal the bank￿ s total capital as long as capital is non-negative. While this model implication
is stark, it helps to isolate the incentives of bank shareholders to increase risk for the purpose
of exploiting contingent capital investors.
Unlike a structural credit risk model such as Merton (1974) where assets follow a pure dif-
fusion process and asset risk can be summarized by a single parameter, ￿, the current paper￿ s
model has several additional risk parameters that need to be considered: the risk-neutral proba-
bility of jumps (￿); the jump size volatility (￿y); and the mean jump size (￿y). As will be seen,
these parameters of the risk-neutral distribution of asset returns can have disparate e⁄ects on
risk-taking incentives.
The analysis of risk-taking incentives considers di⁄erent forms of contingent capital and
subordinated bonds, but where each ￿ve-year maturity bond was issued at its fair credit spread
when the bond had a par value of 4% of deposits and total bank capital was 10% of deposits.32 It
is assumed that the newly-issued bonds￿credit spreads re￿ ect the benchmark asset risk parameter
values (￿ = 1, ￿y = 0:02, ￿y = ￿0:01, and ￿ = 0:02). Then, for a given capital ratio, the market
value of original shareholders￿equity is computed for a 25% change in the value of one of the
asset risk parameters (￿ = 1:25 or ￿y = 0:025 or ￿y = ￿0:0125 or ￿ = 0:025).3334 The change in
the market value of shareholders￿equity due to this 25% parameter change is graphed in Figures
9 to 12. Note that since the values of original shareholders￿equity plus contingent capital or
subordinated bonds always sum to total capital, the change in the value of the bond exactly
equals minus the change in shareholders￿equity.
32Contingent capital and subordinated debt are assumed to pay ￿ oating coupons. The results for ￿xed-coupon
bonds are extremely similar.
33Admittedly, this parameter change is an out-of-equilibrium event in that it was not foreseen by bondholders
when initial credit spreads were set. However, it would be straightforward to model parameter change dynamics
in a rational framework. For example, risk parameters might be speci￿ed as a function of the bank￿ s asset-to-
deposit ratio, xt, and initial fair credit spreads could be computed via a similar Monte Carlo valuation but where
risk parameters vary with the state variable, xt. Most likely initial credit spreads would rise to re￿ ect this moral
hazard but the qualitative results regarding banks￿incentives to shift risk would be similar to the current analysis.
34A change in the asset risk-parameters does not a⁄ect the risk-neutral expected rate of return on the bank￿ s
assets, which continues to equal the instantaneous-maturity interest rate, rt.
253.3.1 Jump Risk
Figure 9 considers the increase in shareholders￿equity when there is a 25% increase in the
probability of jumps, ￿. While in all cases the resulting increase in shareholders￿equity (bond
value) is positive (negative), the increase is smallest for the contingent capital Bond A which
converts at par with a 2% equity threshold (p = 1, e = 2%). For moderate and high levels of
capital, a rise in the frequency of jumps has a signi￿cantly adverse e⁄ect on contingent capital
Bond B that converts at a discount (p = 0:9, e = 2:4%). Intuitively, when capital is high, a
greater probability of jumps has a larger marginal e⁄ect on reducing the value of contingent
capital that would su⁄er a loss at conversion. For contingent capital Bond C that converts
when total capital equals 5% (p = 1, e = 1%), a rise in the probability of jumps is especially
damaging at low capital levels because, with its smaller 1% equity conversion cushion, a jump
has a greater likelihood of preventing full conversion. Similar reasoning explains why the
non-convertible subordinated Bond D creates the greatest incentive for risk shifting: with no
conversion bu⁄er, a jump in asset value is more likely to impose losses to subordinated debt
investors, thereby transferring more value to shareholders.
Figure 10 presents similar analysis for the case of a 25% increase in the volatility of jumps,
￿y. It is similar to the results in Figure 9 in that risk shifting incentives are greatest when
the bank issues subordinated Bond D, followed by contingent capital Bond C which converts
at a 5% capital threshold (p = 1, e = 1%), followed by contingent capital Bond A (p = 1,
e = 2%) and B (p = 0:9, e = 2:4%) which convert at a 6% capital ratio. This ordering con￿rms
the importance of the conversion threshold in protecting bondholders. A larger capital bu⁄er
between the conversion threshold and the bond￿ s par value (0% for subordinated Bond D, 1%
for Bond C, and 2% for Bonds A and B) protects bondholders because a sudden loss in asset
value that moves capital into this bu⁄er would not harm bondholders. One interesting aspect
of the results is that for all four bonds, the incentive for risk taking peaks at capital levels from
around 1.5% to 2% above the bond￿ s respective conversion thresholds. A likely explanation is
that the calculations measure the marginal e⁄ect of an increase in jump volatility on the values
of shareholders￿equity and bonds. Since an increase in ￿y fattens the tails of the asset return
distribution, the marginal e⁄ect of a greater tail probability in exposing bondholders to partial
conversion losses may be greatest at a point signi￿cantly above the capital conversion threshold.
The results in Figure 11 are qualitatively similar to those in Figures 9 and 10. It shows
results for a 25% change in the mean jump size, ￿y, from -1% to -1.25%. As with the other jump
risk parameters, a bank￿ s incentive to risk-shift is greatest with subordinated Bond D, followed
by contingent capital Bond C that converts at the 5% capital threshold. Risk-shifting incentives
are lowest for contingent capital Bond A (p = 1, e = 2%), except very near the capital conversion
threshold where the marginal e⁄ect for Bond B (p = 0:9, e = 2:4%) becomes least. Again, these
results highlight the critical role of the capital conversion bu⁄er in protecting bondholders from
26jump risk.
3.3.2 Di⁄usion Risk
Finally, Figure 12 calculates the change in the value of shareholders￿equity from a 25% increase
in the bank asset di⁄usion volatility, ￿. In some ways, the results are qualitatively di⁄erent from
those relating to the jump risk parameters. Except for a bank that issues contingent capital
Bond B which converts at a discount (p = 0:9, e = 2:4%), shareholders have a disincentive
to increase di⁄usion volatility when capital falls near a bond￿ s conversion threshold. The
explanation for this ￿nding is that a larger impact of Brownian motion uncertainty makes it
more likely that a bond￿ s capital conversion threshold will be reached via a continuous decline
in the bank￿ s asset value, rather than a downward jump that could breach the threshold. With
a greater likelihood of full conversion occurring at the threshold, there is a smaller possibility
of bondholders su⁄ering a loss.35 Hence, shareholders cannot gain when the bank increases
such ￿small scale￿di⁄usion risk. Contingent capital Bond B is a notable exception because its
conversion discount implies that bondholders su⁄er a loss even when conversion occurs exactly
at the threshold.
4 Conclusion
This paper￿ s structural credit risk model provides a framework for valuing contingent bank
capital and bank shareholders￿ equity. The model incorporates a realistic feature of bank
asset returns, namely, that they sometimes experience sudden, discrete declines, often during a
￿nancial crisis. Since a primary motivation for contingent capital is to alleviate ￿nancial distress
and protect taxpayers during a crisis, understanding the role of jump risk is critical. Indeed,
the possibility of sudden large losses in a bank￿ s asset value has a qualitatively distinct impact
on contingent capital credit spreads. Without asset jump risk, standard contingent capital that
converts at par would be default-free and require a zero credit spread. With asset jump risk,
conversion at below par value becomes feasible, so that new-issue credit spreads for contingent
capital become positive.
Credit spreads for both ￿xed- and ￿ oating-coupon contingent capital will be higher when
they are issued at low levels of bank capital and when the conversion threshold of original
shareholders￿equity is low. Contingent capital investors will require higher new-issue credit
spreads, even in the absence of jump risk, if the conversion terms specify a discount to par value
since losses occur at conversion. The e⁄ect of a dual price trigger for conversion is to make
35This reasoning holds even for subordinated debt investors due to the assumption that the bank is closed when
total capital falls to equal the par value of subordinated debt.
27contingent capital a blend of non-convertible subordinated debt and standard single price trigger
contingent capital. Therefore, yields on dual price trigger contingent capital will fall between
those of comparable single price trigger contingent capital and subordinated debt.
A bank that issues contingent capital faces a moral hazard incentive to increase its assets￿
jump risks. However, this incentive to transfer value from contingent capital investors to
the bank￿ s shareholders is smaller than that when the bank has issued a similar amount of
subordinated debt rather than contingent capital. Thus, relative to the status quo, there is likely
to be a decline in moral hazard if contingent capital replaces subordinated debt. The results
show that excessive risk-taking incentives also decline as contingent capital￿ s equity conversion
threshold rises. With a bigger ￿equity cushion￿at the conversion threshold, there is a smaller
likelihood that a sudden loss in bank asset value would prevent full conversion, thereby better
protecting contingent capital investors from losses.
In conclusion, this paper￿ s structural analysis suggests that contingent capital would be
a feasible, low-cost method of mitigating ￿nancial distress, particularly when its conversion
threshold is set at a relatively high level of original shareholders￿equity. Indeed, contingent
capital may reduce a bank￿ s moral hazard incentives relative to other forms of debt-like capital.
Because it reduces e⁄ective leverage and the pressure for government bailouts, contingent capital
deserves serious consideration as part of a package of reforms that stabilize the ￿nancial system
and eliminate ￿Too-Big-to-Fail.￿
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Figure 10
Change in the Value of Shareholders’ Equity
For a 25% Increase in the Volatility of Jumps ( σy )
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Change in the Value of Shareholders’ Equity
For a 25% Decline in the Mean Jump Size ( μy )
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